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Article 3

Summary Judgments in Antitrust Conspiracy
Litigation
C. PAUL ROGERS II*
INTRODUCTION

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
summary judgment may be granted, prior to trial, on the basis of
affidavits, depositions and other materials showing, "that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to relief as a matter of law."' The purpose of the rule is
to determine whether the parties have evidence justifying the burden of a trial.2 Thus, summary judgment is employed against litigants who lack sufficient evidence to reach a jury and will therefore
probably suffer a directed verdict at trial.
The Supreme Court views the use of summary judgment in antitrust conspiracy litigation with skepticism.3 The Court believes that

claims of conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws raise peculiar problems which counsel in favor of limited use of summary judgment
procedures. The purpose of this article is to investigate and analyze
the typical methodology the federal courts use in considering and
reviewing motions for summary judgment in these cases. The
article also attempts to determine whether the apparent judicial
reluctance to grant summary judgment in antitrust conspiracy litigation can be justified in a strict legal sense or in some other rational
* Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago; B.A. 1970, J.D. 1973, University of Texas; LL.M. 1977, Columbia University; member, Pennsylvania Bar. The author
acknowledges the useful help of two Loyola students, Rich Cozzola and Shelly Kulwin, at
various stages of this project.
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See Asbill & Snell, Summary Judgment Under the FederalRules
- When an Issue of Fact is Presented, 51 MICH. L. Rav. 1143 (1953); Bauman, A Rationale
of Summary Judgment, 33 IND. L.J. 467 (1958); Clark, The Summary Judgment, 36 MINN.
L. REY. 567 (1952); Guiher, Summary Judgments - Tactical Problem of the Trial Lawyer,
48 VA. L. Rav. 1263 (1962); Korn & Paley, Survey of Summary Judgment, Judgment on the
Pleadings and Related Pre-Trial Procedures, 42 CoRNiLL L.Q. 483 (1957); Louis, Federal
Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALz L.J. 745 (1974).
2. See F. JAMES & G. HAzAD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CiviwPiocDnu E 219-21 (2d ed.
1977).
3. This article will deal primarily with defendants' motions for summary judgment in
antitrust conspiracy litigation. The Supreme Court in particular, and courts in general have
been less skeptical of summary judgment in cases where the plaintiff makes a motion for
summary judgment and "the defendant's conduct falls unambiguously within a rule of per
se illegality." 2 P. AREanA & D.F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw, 59, 68 (1978). See International
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
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manner. Initially, however, it is necessary to consider the difficulties
in establishing an antitrust conspiracy generally.
PROVING ANTITRUST CONSPIRACIES BY INDIRECT EVIDENCE

Section One of the Sherman Act prohibits "contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy" in restraint of trade.' In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States,5 the Supreme Court determined that
direct evidence of the existence of a conspiracy was not essential
to support a Section One action. Rather, the Court held, evidence
of a conspiracy for antitrust purposes can be shown by indirect or
circumstantial proof that raises an "inference of agreement" among
the alleged co-conspirators.6 Such an inference may be raised by
conscious parallel business conduct.7
For example, in Interstate Circuit two movie theater chains sent
eight film distributors identical letters that demanded that the distributors cease supplying first-run films to exhibitors who refused
to meet a schedule of minimum prices or who showed first-run
films as part of a double feature.' Subsequently the distributors
were individually contacted by an agent of the theater chains. The
eight distributors acquiesced separately to the chains' demands
and each put the requested restrictions into effect."
The Court pointed out that the proposal was couched so that if
all agreed, the distributors would gain increased profits. 0 Further,
4. 15 U.S.C.A. §1 (1975).
5. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
6. Id. at 221, 225.
7. Proof of conspiratorial conduct is also important in some Section 2 litigation. It is a
separate offense under Section 2 for two or more persons to conspire to monopolize. The proof
of conspiracy must be coupled with evidence of specific intent to accomplish a monopoly,
although typically the intent is inferred from the conduct which establishes the conspiracy.
Thus, if firms with large shares of a market conspire to engage in some form of anticompetitive activity, it may be inferred that they intended to monopolize. United States v. Griffith,
334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946);
Schine Theatres v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948); Salco Corp. v. General Motors, 517
F.2d 567, 576 (10th Cir. 1975); Sulmeyer v. Coca Cola Co., 515 F.2d 835, 851 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); Lewis v. Pennington, 400 F.2d 806, 811 (6th Cir. 1968). See
L. SuLuvAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 132-33 (1977).

8. The two theater chains had dominant control in many of the markets in which they
operated theaters. For example, Interstate Circuit had a complete monopoly on first-run
theaters in five major Texas cities. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208,
215 (1939). The two chains each contributed more than 74 percent of the license. fees paid by
the theaters in the respective territories in which they operated. Thus the exhibitors' demands
were of immediate concern to the distributors.
9. The initial letters to the distributors had disclosed the names of all the addresses, so
each recipient knew that similar demands were being made on its competitors. Id. at 216.
The letter itself is reproduced at 215-16 n.3.
10. Id. at 222.
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each distributor would risk a substantial loss of business to
subsequent-run and independent film exhibitors if it alone accepted
the proposal: the exhibitors would then purchase films from distributors not requiring the restrictive showing practices and raised admission prices." Even though no direct proof of a conspiracy existed,
the Court found that "it taxe[d] credulity" to believe that the
distributors would have independently initiated, "such far reaching
changes in their business methods without some understanding that
all were to join."' 2
But in Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount Film Distributing
Corp.,'3 the Court found that mere conscious parallel business conduct was not enough to support an inference of a conspiracy. There
it was alleged that certain motion picture producers and distributors had violated Section One by conspiring to restrict first-run
motion pictures to downtown Baltimore theaters, thus confining
suburban theaters to subsequent runs. The plaintiff, a suburban
theater, had been separately and uniformly denied first-run films
by the defendant distributors. Although no direct evidence of an
illegal agreement existed, the plaintiff asserted that the conscious
parallel business conduct of the eight distributors raised an inference that the distributors had tacitly agreed to exclude plaintiff
from the first-run motion picture market."
In response, the defendants argued that it was economically unsound to place first-run pictures in suburban theaters because those
theaters were not easily accessible by public transportation and
consequently had a drawing power of less than one-tenth of a downtown theater. Thus, the downtown theaters offered a far greater
opportunity for widespread advertisement and exposure of newly
released films.
11. The defendant distributors distributed about 75 percent of all first-class films exhibited in the United States. Since the market was oligopolic in structure, each distributor
was acutely aware of the practices of its major competitors. See generally Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelismand Refusals to Deal, 75
HARv. L. REv. 665, 658-70 (1962).
12. Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 223 (1939). The Court found it
significant that the defendants had failed to call as witnesses corporate officers who were in
a position to know whether their company had acted pursuant to agreement. Once the proof
supported the inference of concerted action, the Court placed the burden upon the defendants to refute the evidence by their own affirmative proof. See also United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 393, 401 (1948); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683
(1948); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); United States v.
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942); see generally Rahl, Conspiracyand the Antitrust Laws,
44 ILL. L. REV. 743 (1950); Note, The Nature of a Sherman Act Conspiracy, 54 COLuM. L.
REv. 673 (1958).
13. 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
14. Id. at 539-40.
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In ruling for the defendants, the Court stated that the crucial
question was whether the defendants' conduct stemmed from independent business decisions or from a tacit or express agreement to
exclude the plaintiff from the first-run market.'5 The defendants
had introduced evidence of local market conditions which, they asserted, precluded suburban theaters from generating the revenue
and exposure of first-run films showing in downtown theaters. On
this basis, the Court found that the conscious parallel refusal to
license the plaintiff did not raise an inference that would support a
finding of conspiracy. The uniform action was attributed to individual business judgment motivated by the distributors' desire for
maximum revenue.'" Unlike the situation in Interstate Circuit, the
Court here found that no interdependence existed among the
alleged conspirators."
The Theatre Enterprises decision demonstrated that conscious
parallel conduct, without additional evidence, neither establishes
the existence of an illegal agreement nor itself constitutes a violation
of the Sherman Act. Justice Clark, writing for the Theatre
Enterprisesmajority, concluded that "conscious parallelism has not
yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely."' 8 Thus,
Theatre Enterprises, reduced conscious parallelism to merely another, albeit potentially significant, form of circumstantial evidence.

'1

Underlying the Court's reluctance to equate conscious parallelism
with conspiracy is the judicial disinclination to interfere with internal business decisions.0 The lower courts have followed a similar
policy of requiring additional circumstantial proof, labeled "plus
factors," to raise an inference of an illegal agreement where no direct
evidence of conspiracy exists." For example, in C-O-Two Fire
Equipment Co. v United States,2 conscious parallelism was estab15. Id. at 540.
16. See also Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States, 178 F.2d 363, 369 (8th Cir. 1949).
17. Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1953).
18. Id.
19. See Note, Summary Judgment in Antitrust Litigation- Probative Force of a Refusal
to Deal, 49 B.U.L. Rav. 368, 372 (1969).
20. See, e.g., Maple Flooring Manufacturers Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
One lower court expressed the view that the judiciary should confine itself to determining
whether the actions of the parties violate the law and should avoid dictating to the management of a business how to conduct its affairs. Orbo Theatre Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 156 F. Supp.
770, 778 (D.D.C. 1970).
21. See, e.g., Synfy Enterprises v. National Gen. Theatres, Inc., 575 F.2d 233 (9th Cir.
1978); Gainesville Utilities v. Florida Power & Light Co., 573 F.2d 292, 301 (5th Cir. 1978);
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1977); Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral
Products Co., 521 F.2d 1309 (3d Cir. 1975); FTC v. Lukens Steel Co., 454 F. Supp. 1182
(D.D.C. 1978).
22. 197 F.2d 489 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952).
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lished by the existence of identical prices throughout the industry.
Additional plus factors inferentially established the existence of a
conspiracy. These factors included artificial standardization of
products, the raising of prices at a time when a surplus existed in
the industry, the submission of identical bids to public agencies and
the policing of dealers to maintain minimum prices.?
JUDICIAL RELUCTANCE TO GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN ANTITRUST
CONSPIRACY CASES

In view of the judicial refusal to equate conscious parallel business
activity with conspiracy, summary judgment procedure in antitrust
conspiracy litigation would seem rather straightforward. An antitrust plaintiff attempting to establish a prima facie inferential conspiracy, and thereby defeat a motion for summary judgment, would
have to exhibit to the court some factors indicating an agreement
in addition to knowing parallel conduct. The Supreme Court, however, has been reluctant to sanction a summary judgment unless
the plaintiff can offer virtually no evidence to support the existence
of a conspiracy." Some appellate courts have followed suit and
held that summary judgment should not be granted if there is the
"slightest doubt" as to any material fact.?
The foundation of the judicial aversion to summary judgments in
antitrust litigation apparently lies in Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.2 In Poller, CBS had a network agreement
with a Milwaukee UHF station.2 7 Anticipating an amendment to
the Federal Communications Commission Regulations that would
permit networks to own additional UHF stations, CBS acquired an
option to purchase another, unsuccessful Milwaukee UHF station
23. Id. at 497; see also Milgram v. Loew's Inc., 192 F.2d 579, 583 (3d Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 929 (1952).
24. See text accompanying notes 26-38, infra.
25. The slightest doubt test actually antedates Poller. Lower federal courts have applied
the test to a variety of factual situations in the summary judgment context. See, e.g., Devex
Corp. v. Houdaille Indus., Inc., 382 F.2d 17, 21 (7th Cir. 1967); Armco Steel Corp. v. Realty
Investment Co., 273 F.2d 483, 484 (8th Cir. 1960); Cox v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co.,
249 F.2d 616, 618 (9th Cir. 1954); Gottlieb v. Isenman, 215 F.2d 184, 186 (1st Cir. 1954); Shafer
v. Reo Motors, 205 F.2d 685, 688 (3d Cir. 1953); Doehler Metal Furniture Co. v. United
States, 149 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 1945). Recently, however, the "slightest doubt" approach
has been characterized as "an unwarranted gloss on the 'genuine issue' requirement." Report
of the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures, reprinted in
ANTTRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 897 at 21. The use of the test appears to be
declining. The Second Circuit, for example, has expressly rejected the standard found in
earlier decisions. Beal v. Lindsay, 468 F.2d 287, 291 (2d Cir. 1972); Dressler v. MV Sandpiper,
331 F.2d 130, 132-34 (2d Cir. 1964).
26. 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
27. Id. at 465-66. The UHF station was actually the assignor of the plaintiff.
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in a straw man transaction. When the FCC amendment went into
effect, CBS exercised the option and terminated the network
agreement with plaintiff. The disaffiliated station was forced to sell
its equipment and facilities to CBS at an inexpensive price since it
had been left without a network agreement. Subsequently, CBS
terminated operation of the purchased UHF station, leaving no
UHF station in Milwaukee. 8
The plaintiff alleged that CBS's actions constituted a conspiracy
to force plaintiff out of business and eliminate all UHF competition
in the area for CBS's VHF stations. CBS filed a motion for summary
judgment and supported its motion with affidavits from its executives denying the existence of a conspiracy, and asserting that their
actions arose from a legitimate business decision. Thus, the motives
of CBS in terminating its network affiliation with the plaintiff were
at issue. The Supreme Court, viewing the record in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion, reversed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment and concluded:
We believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly in
complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading
roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators,
and hostile witnesses thicken the plot. It is only when the witnesses
are present and subject to cross-examination that their credibility
and the weight to be given their testimony can be appraised. 9
Although the plaintiff in Poller failed to prove conclusively that
a conspiracy existed, it did present evidence indicating that its contentions were "more than fantasy."' 0 For example, a deposition of
one Holt, an alleged co-conspirator, showed that Holt knew that the
"obvious purpose and necessary effect" of CBS's cancellation of the
affiliation and its subsequent purchase of another UHF station
would be to eliminate independent UHF stations in Milwaukee, and
that this result would work to Holt's personal benefit.3 ' Further,
other evidence supported the theory that CBS preferred VHF to
28. Id. at 467.
29. Id. at 473. See also Six Twenty-Nine Prod. v. Rollins Telecasting, 365 F.2d 478 (5th
Cir. 1966); Harlem River Consumers Co-Op, Inc. v. Associated Grocers of Harlem, Inc., 53
F.R.D. 691, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). It should be noted that federal courts are generally reluctant
to grant summary judgment in any situation in which motive and intent are involved. See
Cross v. United States, 336 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1964) (disputed tax deduction for educational
trip); Empire Electronics Co. v. United States, 311 F.2d 175, 180 (2d Cir. 1962) (conversion
action); Bragen v. Hudson County News Co., 278 F.2d 615, 618 (3d Cir. 1960) (antitrust
conspiracy alleged). Cf. Lunden v. Cordner, 354 F.2d 401 (8th Cir. 1966); Dyer v. MacDougall,
201 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1952).
30. 368 U.S. at 472.
31. Id. at 470.
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UHF stations and previously had abandoned other UHF stations in
favor of VHF outlets. 2
Subsequently, in Norfolk Monument Co., Inc. v. Woodlawn
Memorial Gardens,3 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its skepticism
of the propriety of permitting summary judgments in antitrust conspiracy litigation. In Norfolk, the plaintiff, retailer of burial monuments and bronze grave markers, sued a manufacturer of grave
markers and five cemetery operators. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendants were engaged in a conspiracy to discourage the sales of
34
its grave markers for installation in the conspirator's cemeteries.
The Court, in a per curiam opinion, reversed the trial court's grant
of summary judgment for defendantsu Although the plaintiff had
produced no evidence of any communications among the defendants that showed concerted action, the Court found that the parallel
conduct of defendants raised questions from which a jury could infer
the existence of a conspiracy." The plaintiff had disputed the business justifications for defendants' parallel conduct in a sufficient
manner to raise a material question of fact for a jury. Thus, the
Court concluded that "the alleged conspiracy had not been conclu'3
sively disproved by pretrial discovery.'
It is apparent from Poller and Norfolk Monument that the Court,
perhaps because of its reluctance to conclude antitrust conspiracy
cases before a jury trial, is placing the burden of proof squarely on
the summary judgment movant. Norfolk Monument indicates that
to gain summary judgment a defendant movant must rebut conclusively any inferences of the existence of concerted action that the
plaintiff raises in its allegations. An antitrust conspiracy, however,
can be shown by indirect or inferential proof.3 8 Thus, the resulting

burden on a movant defendant to show that no genuine issue exists
about a possible inferential conspiracy is formidable.
However in First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service
Co.,3' a case decided between Poller and Norfolk Monument, the
Court affirmed a grant of summary judgment for defendants denying the existence of a conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws. The
suit alleged that seven large oil companies had maintained a world32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 472.
394 U.S. 700 (1969).
Id. at 701.
Id. at 704.
Id. at 701-03.
Id. at 704.
See text accompanying notes 4-23, supra.
391 U.S. 253 (1968).
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wide oil cartel since 1928 and more recently had conspired to boycott Iranian oil in all markets.40 The conspiracy allegedly had
begun in 1951 in response to the nationalization by the Iranian
government of the properties of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. It was
asserted that six of the defendants, excluding Cities Service,
agreed to boycott Iranian oil throughout the world until Iran returned Anglo-Iranian's property and concession rights.4
Subsequent to the nationalization, plaintiff had succeeded in obtaining a contract to purchase 15 million metric tons of oil from the
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), the Iranian government's
successor to Anglo-Iranian. The plaintiff asserted that the six defendants had conspired to prevent him from selling any of the oil he
was entitled to sell under his contract with NIOC. Cities Service,
following lengthy negotiations with plaintiff, allegedly joined the
conspiracy to boycott plaintiff after receiving a bribe of a large
supply of oil from Kuwait at a price lower than that offered by
plaintiff. 2 Subsequently, the defendants avowedly entered into a
consortium agreement to allot the Iranian oil production among,
themselves.43 The plaintiff claimed that the conspiracy completely
thwarted his ability to sell oil under his contract with NIOC and
sued for treble damages."
In 1965, almost ten years after plaintiff filed his original complaint, Cities Service was granted a summary judgment.45 In affirm40. Id. at 259-61.
41. Id. at 260.
42. Id.
43. In 1963, while the motion for summary judgment by Cities Service was pending, the
plaintiff amended his complaint by replacing the specific references to the Kuwait oil transaction and the consortium agreement with allegations of boycott and conspiracy. Id. at 267.
44. Id. at 260-61.
45. Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 38 F.R.D. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The trial judge had
postponed ruling on Cities Service's summary judgment motion for some time. Although
plaintiff was permitted additional discovery under Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the court limited the extent of the discovery because it considered the claim
against Cities Service to be insubstantial. Id. at 173. As a result, plaintiff was not permitted
to depose the president of Cities Service, who allegedly was the only person with full knowledge of the events upon which the alleged conspiracy was founded. 391 U.S. at 303. (Black,
J., dissenting).
On appeal to the Supreme Court, plaintiff claimed that the district court's limitation to
discovery under Rule 56(f), which prevented his deposition of Cities Service's president,
improperly limited the discovery permitted him prior to the rendering of a summary judgment. Plaintiff pointed out that the president had made a trip to Kuwait while considering
plaintiffs offer of Iranian oil. After this trip, where Cities Service allegedly agreed to buy its
oil from Gulf and join the oil consortium, the defendant was no longer interested in dealing
with plaintiff. In addition, plaintiff, hoping to raise an inference of conspiracy, pointed out
that Cities Service had tried to keep this trip secret for a number of years (1952-1964).
Plaintiff claimed that in limiting discovery under Rule 56(f), the district court had prevented
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ing, the Supreme Court found that the one unequivocal fact produced by plaintiff which supported a conspiracy theory, Cities Service's failure to contract with plaintiff for the purchase of Iranian Oil,
was not sufficiently probative of the existence of a conspiracy to
defeat summary judgment." The Court found that the other evidence relied upon by plaintiff to raise the inference of a conspiracy,
aside from the simple failure to deal, was also inadequate." In addition, Cities Service produced substantial evidence rebutting the inference the plaintiff sought to establish.
In determining that Cities' refusal to deal with plaintiff did not
raise a sufficient inference of an illegal agreement to get to the jury,
the Court considered the inferences that could reasonably be drawn
from the parallel behavior of Cities and the other defendants, i.e.,
the refusal to buy plaintiff's oil. The Court found that the record
contained an overwhelming amount of evidence that Cities' motives
in refusing to deal with the plaintiff sprung from independent business decisions and business judgment." For example, the plaintiff
argued that Cities' refusal to purchase plaintiff's oil on attractive
terms suggested improper motives. But the Court held that the
probability that such a purchase would engender ill will among
companies competing with Cities, with attendant unfavorable business consequences to Cities, rebutted any inferences of conspiratorial intent.49 The Court concluded that "not only is the inference
that Cities' failure to deal was the product of factors other than
conspiracy at least equal to the inference that it was due to conspirdiscovery of what had happened on the Kuwait trip.
The Court, in a detailed analysis, of the facts, ruled that plaintiff "has had sufficient
discovery either to substantiate his claims of conspiracy to the extent of raising a material
issue of fact thereon, or of providing a basis for investigation of his own to gather additional
evidence during the five years for which Cities' motion was pending below." Id. at 298. But
see id. at 305-07 (Black, J., dissenting).
46. 391 U.S. at 286-88.
47. Plaintiff had been unable to obtain any indication from depositions of Cities Service
executives that any of them knew of a conspiracy to refuse to deal with plaintiff. As noted,
plaintiff was unable to depose the president of Cities Service, allegedly the only person who
could have known of the existence of such a conspiracy. See note 45, supra. Further, the
president had died by the time the trial court granted summary judgment. 391 U.S. at 268
n.7.
48. Id. at 277.
49. Id. at 279-80. After nationalization, the depossessed company, Anglo-Iranian, publicly
announced its intention to bring lawsuits against any purchaser of Iranian oil. Other major
oil companies supported Anglo-Iranian, since they were afraid of nationalization of their
properties in countries in which they held concessions if the Iranian take-over went unchecked. Many oil purchasers, in addition to Cities, subsequently refused to purchase Iranian
oil. The Court found this explanation of Cities' conduct more plausible than plaintiff's theory
of a boycott directed against him, particularly in view of the fact that Cities produced
evidence that the alleged Kuwait pay-off was arranged long before nationalization. Id. at 278.
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acy, thus negating the probative force of the evidence showing such
a failure, but the former inference is more probable."5 0 Thus, as in
Theatre Enterprises, evidence supporting independent business
decision-making rebutted an inference supporting conspiratorial
motive raised by conscious parallel business behavior.
The Court believed that its decision in Cities Service was consistent with Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., even
though it reached divergent results in cases that, at least superficially, contained substantial factual similarities.5 ' Each case is
centrally concerned with the motives of the defendant in failing to
conclude a business deal with the plaintiff. Nonetheless, the Court
believed that factual differences concerning the relationship of the
parties substantially altered the inferences of motive that can be
2
reasonably drawn from each set of circumstances.
In the Court's view, Pollerwas distinguishable from Cities Service
because the plaintiff and defendant were competitors; therefore, it
was plausible to argue that CBS planned to eliminate the plaintiff
as a competitive factor.s In contrast, the Court in Cities Service
found that the parties were not competitors since the plaintiff was
a supplier of oil and the defendant was a purchaser. 54 The Court also
determined that Cities was not in the same competitive position as
the other alleged co-conspirators since Cities was neither a member
of defendants' international cartel to control foreign oil nor had a
large supply of foreign oil readily available as did the other defendants.-"
The Cities Service Court, in affirming the grant of summary
judgment, decided that the most probable inferences from the
facts failed to support a theory of conspiracy." Arguably the Cities
50. Id. at 280.
51. Id. at 285.
52. Id. at 287.
53. Id. at 285. The court found Interstate Circuit distinguishable for the same reasons.
There, as in Poller, all the alleged co-conspirators were shown to have the same-motive to
enter into a tacit agreement. Id. at 287. See text accompanying notes 11 & 12, supra.
54. 391 U.S. at 285.
55. Id. at 279. But see Note, First National Bank v. Cities Service Co., 10 B.C. IND. &
COM. L. REv. 196, 204 (1968) [hereinafter cited as FirstNational Bank Note]. Justice Black
vigorously dissented in Cities Service and stated his belief that the majority's holding could
not possibly be reconciled with Poller. 391 U.S. at 303. To him the Poller warning against
the use of summary judgment in antitrust litigation was directed explicitly to situations
exemplified by Cities Service. He did not believe that Poller permitted the court to create a
standard whereby the granting of summary judgment depended upon which party's inferences were most probable. Such an approach resulted in the judge usurping the role of the
jury and "depriv[ed] parties of their constitutional right to trial by jury." Id. at 304.
56. See Withrow & Larm, The "Big" Antitrust Case: 25 Years of Sisyphean Labor, 62
CORNELL L. Rav. 1, 32 (1976).
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Service approach constitutes a lesser standard than that articulated
in Poller and subsequently affirmed in Norfolk Monument, where
the Court required the movant to disprove conclusively factual inferences supporting the existence of concerted action. Further, it is
questionable that the Cities Service Court viewed the record in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, thus ignoring
Poller's requirement that any balancing of probable inferences take
place only after ambiguities are resolved in favor of the non-moving
party.57
More recently in Adickes v S.H. Kress & Co.,5 8 a civil rights case
in which plaintiff alleged a conspiracy between defendant restaurant and the Hattiesburg, Mississippi, police, the Court reaffirmed
the Poller requirement that the movant for summary judgment
show the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact as viewed
in the light most favorable to the opposing party." The Adickes
Court distinguished Cities Service since the Adickes movant had
"failed to show conclusively that a fact alleged by [the non-moving
party] was 'not susceptible' of an interpretation that might give rise
to an inference of conspiracy."60 In contrast, according to the Court,
the non-moving party in Cities Service received the burden of producing evidence of a conspiracy only after the moving party met the
initial burden of successfully refuting the inferences of conspiracy
relied upon by the non-movant.11
Viewed in this manner, Cities Service may be reconcilable with
the other Supreme Court summary judgment conspiracy cases. The
burden of proof remains on the movant until the movant can show
successfully that the facts taken in the light most favorable to the
opposing party fail to raise an inference of conspiracy."2 Once the
movant satisfies this requirement, the burden of persuasion then
57. 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1961); see also United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655
(1962).
58. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
59. Id.at 157.
60. Id.at 160 n.22. Plaintiff charged that the defendant, in conspiracy with the police,
had refused to serve her at defendant's lunch counter. Although defendant submitted the
deposition of its store manager and the affidavits of several policemen, all denying the conspiracy, and plaintiff admitted that she had no direct evidence of a conspiracy, the Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for defendant. Defendant had
apparently discharged its burden with respect to the existence of a conspiracy before plaintiff
entered the store but had failed to deny that an agreement was reached after plaintiff entered
the store. The inference raised by plaintiff's allegations that a conspiracy arose after she
entered the store was not adequately refuted by defendant and summary judgment could not
properly issue.
61. Id. at 160 n.22, citing 391 U.S. at 289.
62. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e), Advisory Committee Note on 1963 Amendment to subdivision (e) of Rule 56.
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shifts to the opposing party to bring forth additional evidence of the
existence of a conspiracy. Summary judgment results if no additional facts supporting an inference of concerted activity are forthcoming. 3 Thus, in Cities Service the movant successfully showed
that the inferences raised by plaintiff's factual allegations did not
support a conspiracy theory. The plaintiff then failed to come up
with additional facts to support a finding of conspiracy; as a result
summary judgment was granted to the defendant.
Perhaps the troublesome aspect of Cities Service is not the methodology of the decision, but the Court's analysis of the facts and its
conclusion that no inference of conspiracy was raised. One commentator has suggested that Cities' dependency for oil upon other defendant producers who were boycotting Iranian oil could indicate Cities' interest in the ultimate success of the boycott of plaintiff's sale
of Iranian nationalized oil. Cities' refusal to deal with plaintiff could
then be seen as the result of concerted action. 4 Under this interpretation, the non-competitive business relationship of plaintiff and
defendant Cities, as supplier and prospective purchaser, fails to
legitimize Cities' refusal to buy plaintiff's oil.6
Thus, the existence of a conspiracy in Cities Service could easily
be inferred. Under this view, Cities failed to meet the Poller and
Norfolk Monument standard of conclusively rebutting the inferences of conspiracy raised by the non-moving party. The Cities
Service Court's affirmation of the grant of summary judgment
based upon the inference deemed more probable from the failure to
deal is apparently irreconcilable with the Poller and Norfolk
Monument summary judgment requirements .61
63. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
64. First National Bank Note, supra note 55, at 204. The Court noted that plaintiff could
have argued at the trial level that Cities' acquiescence, because of the threatening conduct
of others, in an illegal scheme carved out by the others for their own benefit, ties Cities in
as a member of the illegal combination. See Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359
U.S. 207 (1959). Because plaintiff did not properly raise the argument before the trial court
it could not be considered on appeal. 391 U.S. at 280 n.16.
65. Thus, Cities' interests would be adverse to plaintiff even though they were not competitors in a normal business sense. Adversity of interest could then be said to exist in Cities
Service just as it did in Poller, even though the adversity there was attributable to the fact
that the parties were competitors. However, the reason for the adversity would not seem to
be controlling; the salient inference which must be drawn from plaintiff's allegations is that
there did exist an adversity of interest between the parties, regardless of their respective
positions as competitors. See First National Bank Note, supra note 55, at 204.
66. 391 U.S. at 280. Curiously, while Poller advises against the use of summary judgment
in "complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles," the Court
approved the grant of summary judgment only in the most complex factual and inferential
case.
More recently the Supreme Court reaffirmed Poler's"concededly rigorous standard" with
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BURDEN OF PROOF

Cities Service illustrates the difficulties inherent in deciding a
motion for summary judgment when the movant has the burden of
disproving all inferences of conspiracy raised by the opposing party.
This burden is so substantial that almost any antitrust conspiracy
case in which the court grants summary judgment can be questioned. Interestingly, the standard imposes a greater burden upon
defendant at the summary judgment level than exists at trial where
the plaintiff must present more than mere evidence of conscious
parallel conduct to get to the jury. Further, the placement of this
type of burden upon movants in antitrust cases is discordant with
normal summary judgment standards.
Generally, under Rule 56(c), the party who will bear the burden
of proof at trial must establish all essential elements of his claim or
defense in order to obtain summary judgment." Where, however,
the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, he can
obtain summary judgment by showing that an essential element of
the opposing party's claim is missing. In either situation the ultimate task for the court is to determine whether a "genuine issue of
fact" exists as to the presence of any of the essential elements of the
case. As a practical matter, however, the federal courts typically
place the burden of establishing the absence of any issue of material
fact upon the movant, even where the non-movant party would have
the burden to show the existence of that fact at trial." Thus, as the
regard to dismissals of antitrust suits in a slightly different context. See Hospital Bldg. Co.
v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976). There the court overturned a trial court's
dismissal of an antitrust suit for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief could be
granted. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). At issue was whether the allegations in the complaint were
adequate to support a conclusion that the alleged anticompetitive activity was occurring in
interstate commerce. The court found that the allegations, fairly read, would support proof
that the alleged conspiracy resulted in "unreasonable burdens on the free and uninterrupted
flow" of interstate commerce. 425 U.S. at 746. Poller warranted reversal even though "further
proceedings in [the] case [might] demonstrate that respondents' conduct in fact involves
no violation of law, or indeed no substantial effect on interstate commerce." Id. at 747 n.5.
See also Mutual Fund Investors, Inc. v. Putnam Management Co., 553 F.2d 620 (9th Cir.
1977); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). For a
discussion as to whether the Poller admonitions apply in the directed verdict context, see
Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954); Santa Clara
Valley Distrib. Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 556 F.2d 942, 944 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977). See also
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 260 F.2d 397 (4th Cir. 1958), aff'd on other
grounds, 360 U.S. 395 (1959); Winchester Theatre Co. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.,
324 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1963).
67. Typically, the one bearing the burden of proof at trial is either the plaintiff or a
defendant asserting an affirmative defense. But see FED. R. Ctv. P. 8(d).
68. See, e.g., 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE $ 56.15[3], at 56-473 (3d ed. 1976); 10 C.
WRIGHT

& A.

MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§2727, at 525 (1973).
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Court specifically noted in Adickes, summary judgment will be denied where the movant's evidence is insufficient to establish the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact, even where the opposing
party presents no evidence in his favor.6"
Rule 56(e) requires that an adverse party to a motion for summary
judgment must bring forth specific facts beyond the allegations contained in his pleadings to defeat the motion. The rule specifies that
the adverse party "may not rest upon the allegations or denials of
his pleading" when a motion for summary judgment is "supported
as provided in this rule."70 This language, added by a 1963 amendment to Rule 56, requires affirmative action by an adverse party
beyond his pleadings once the proponent produces evidence establishing the lack of any triable issue of fact."
However, the requirement in Norfolk Monument, which is implicit in Poller, that the movant must disprove conclusively the
existence of a conspiracy to prevail appears to be an unduly restrictive reading of Rule 56(e). Rule 56(e) was amended to permit a court
to pierce the allegations contained in the pleadings when determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists.72 The requirement that the movant disprove conclusively the allegations of the
pleadings before the adverse party must come forth with evidence
effectively negates the purpose of the amendment, since a great
many cases will still be decided by reference to the pleadings.7"
The Supreme Court itself, in Cities Service, rejected the conten69.
70.

398 U.S. at 160, citing FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e), Advisory Committee Notes.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e) provides in pertinent part as follows:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the allegations or denials of his pleading,
but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
71. 1 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE RuLs PAMPHLET at 1034 (1975); see also Wright,
Rule 56(e): A Case Study on the Need for Amending the FederalRules, 69 HARv. L. REv.
839 (1956); REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CERTAIN RuLzs OF CIViL PROCEDUREs FOR
UNITED STATES DisTcT COURTS, 31 F.R.D. 621, 648 (1962) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS]; Note, Summary Judgment Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56 - A Need for a Clarifying Amendment, 48 IowA L. REv. 453 (1963).
72. MOORE, note 71, supra.
73. In Adickes, the Court pointed out that the 1963 amendment was not intended to
modify the burden of the moving party under Rule 56(c) to show initially the absence of a
genuine issue of fact. 398 U.S. 144, 159-60. Thus, summary judgment will be denied "even if
no opposing evidentiary matter is presented" where the evidence supporting the motion does
not establish the absence of a genuine issue of fact. Id. at 160. Certainly, however, conclusive
proof of the absence of a material fact was not contemplated by the amendment, in light of
its avowed purpose to prohibit a non-movant from escaping summary judgment if his pleadings simply contradict the moving party's affidavits concerning the material factual issue.
See REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 71 at 648.
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tion that Rule 56(e) should be excluded in antitrust cases, recognizing that a litigant should not be entitled to a trial on the merits
absent "significant probative evidence" tending to support a valid
complaint." However, the Court may be paying only lip service to
the Rule 56(e) affirmative proof requirement where the movant has
not successfully rebutted the factual inferences of concerted action
arising from the non-movant's complaint.75 For example, the Court
in Adickes refused to require the plaintiff to support its allegations
of conspiracy because the movant had not disproved conclusively
plaintiff's factual allegations of conspiracy."
In general, the judicial reluctance to grant summary judgments
liberally may be best explained by the fear of unjust dismissals and
a concomitant faith in the ability of a trial on the merits to achieve
a proper result in a majority of cases. 71 These notions were candidly
expressed by the Court in Poller where the added complication of
the presence of an inferential conspiracy was at issue.7 8 Thus, because problems of intent and motive were entwined with complex
factual situations, the Court suggested that even greater caution be
74. First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289-90 (1968).
75. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970).
76. Id. at 159-61.
77. See, e.g., Chubbs v. City of New York, 324 F. Supp. 1183, 1189 (E.D.N.Y. 1971),
where a trial court expressed the problem as follows: "Since courts are composed of mere
mortals they can decide matters only on the basis of probability, never on certainty. The
'slightest doubt' test, if it is taken seriously, means that summary judgment is almost never
to be used - a pity in this critical time of overstrained legal resources." See note 81, infra.
See also United Rubber Workers v. Lee Nat'l Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment even while asserting that plaintiff's
claim would be dismissed at trial on the same record); Northwestern Auto Parts v. Chicago
B. & Q. R.R., 240 F.2d 743, 746 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 815 (1957); Dale Hilton,
Inc. v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 27 F.R.D. 468, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See generally Currie,
Thoughts on Directed Verdicts and Summary Judgments, 45 U. Cin. L. Rev. 72 (1977).
However, some courts have specifically recognized the utility of summary judgment procedures in antitrust litigation. For example, the Seventh Circuit recently stated:
the very nature of antitrust litigation would encourage summary disposition of such
cases when permissible. Not only do antitrust trials often encompass a great deal
of expensive and time consuming discovery and trial work, but also. . . the statutory private antitrust remedy of treble damages affords a special temptation for
the institution of vexatious litigation. . . The ultimate determination, after trial,
that an antitrust claim is unfounded, may come too late to guard against the evils
that occur along the way.
Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1978). In another context
the D.C. Circuit noted that summary judgment functions to avoid spurious litigation and
curb "the danger that the threat of such litigation will be used to harass or to coerce a
settlement." Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (libel case);
see also Mintz v. Mathers Fund, Inc. 463 F.2d 495, 498 (7th Cor. 1972).
78. 368 U.S. at 473. See text accompanying note 29, supra.
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used in granting summary judgment in antitrust conspiracy litiga7
tion. 1
It is important to note, however, that despite the merit of the
Court's concern about unjust dismissals in antitrust or conspiracy
cases, Rule 56 makes no special provision for those types of case.
The Court's concern about fairness thus is at odds with the legal
strictures of Rule 56. In essence, the Court has revamped the Rule
56(e) requirements for a particular type of case. In so doing the
Court has given notice that the policies underlying the rule are
inadequate to assure equitable adjudications in antitrust cases.ss
79. Cf. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 259 (1963). The position of the
Poller Court is surprising in view of the 1963 amendment to Rule 56(e). See text accompanying notes 71-72, supra. Professor Wright predicted that the Rule 56(e) amendment would
curtail the refusal of courts to employ summary judgment in "cases in which decision must
turn on motive or intent ..
" Wright, Rule 56(e): A Case Study on the Need for Amending
the Federal Rules, 69 HAv. L. REv. 839, 856 (1956).
Poller'sreluctance to permit summary judgment in deference to the role that the demeanor
and credibility of witnesses play in conspiracy litigation has also come under attack. Louis,
FederalSummary Judgment Doctrine:A CriticalAnalysis, 83 YALE L.J. 745, 765 n.94 (1974).
Professor Louis points out that the credibility and demeanor of defendant's witnesses are
irrelevant at trial unless plaintiff meets his burden of establishing defendant's improper state
of mind. Even if no one believes the defendant's denials of the existence of a conspiracy, the
plaintiff cannot reach the jury without affirmative evidence. Id., citing Dyer v. MacDougall,
201 F.2d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 1952). Professor Louis concludes that a plaintiff should be required
to produce affirmative evidence of the existence of a conspiracy in response to a motion for
summary judgment since at trial he will have the same burden before credibility and demeanor of witnesses become germane to the outcome. If affirmative evidence is shown then
the motion should be denied, since at trial plaintiff would reach the jury.
80. In contrast, the original Advisory Committee note to Rule 56 provides that the rule
"is applicable to all actions." FED. R. Ctv. P. 56 (1938), Advisory Committee Note (emphasis
added). Congress has, of course, specifically granted the Supreme Court the authority to
promulgate rules of civil procedure. 28 U.S.C. §2072 (1966). However, no rule can take effect
until it has been reported to Congress by the Chief Justice. Thus, if the Court is amending
Rule 56 by judicial fiat in Poller, it is transgressing the rule-making authority granted by
Congress.
Arguably, however, the Court is not judicially amending Rule 56 but only stating that the
standards for applying the rule in antitrust cases should be more exacting. But in other
situations, Congress has taken special action to resolve procedural problems posed by certain
classes of cases. For example, in 1968, an act was passed to facilitate the handling of pretrial
procedure in complex litigation such as antitrust and class action suits. 28 U.S.C. §1407
(1968). The legislation established a Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation for permitting
the transfer of related civil actions pending in different federal courts to a single district for
the consolidation of pretrial proceedings. See Withrow & Larm, supra note 56; McElroy,
Federal Pre-Trial Procedure in an Antitrust Suit, 31 Sw. L.J. 649, 687-89 (1977); FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LmGATION (Moore's ed. 1977); Kirkham, Complex
Civil Litigation - Have Good Intentions Gone Away?, 70 F.R.D. 199 (1976).
Contrast the controversy that has brewed from time to time over the role of pleadings in
cases containing complex factual issues. Some federal courts have asserted that a separate,
more vigorous standard of pleading should be required in those cases. See, e.g., Bain & Blank,
Inc. v. Warren-Connelly Co., 19 F.R.D. 108, 109-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). However, the majority
of federal courts refuse to give special treatment to the pleadings in complex or "big" cases
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LOWER FEDERAL COURT USE OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN ANTITRUST
CONSPIRACY LITIGATION

It is noteworthy that, in spite of the obstacles that Poller, Norfolk
Monument and Adickes pose, lower federal courts frequently grant
summary judgment to defendants challenging claims of concerted
action to violate the antitrust laws."' In allowing these motions, the
courts appear to waiver from a strict requirement that the movant
bear the burden of disproving all inferences of conspiracy that arise
from plaintiff's allegations, while seemingly placing, at some point,
the onus upon the opposing party to produce further evidence in
support of its factual allegations of conspiracy. Of course, this approach is in general keeping with Rule 56(e) which mandates affirmative action by a party opposing a motion for summary judgment. 2
For example, in Lamb's Patio Theatre, Inc. v. Universal Film
Exchange," the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment against a theater that had brought suit challenging a motion picture distributor's decision to reject the theater's
bid for a certain motion picture. The defendant had rejected bids
by plaintiff and other theaters in favor of continuing the Chicago
area run of "The Sting" at another theater, at allegedly less favorable terms than offered by plaintiff.
The district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment holding that it had legitimate business considerations for rejecting plaintiff's offer for the movie and noting a "complete absimply because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for it. See Walker Distrib.
Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 1963); Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248
F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957). See generally REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, PROCEDURE IN ANTITRUST AND OTHER PROTRACTED CASES, 13 F.R.D. 62, 66-68 (1953);
Clark, Special Pleading in the "Big Case," 21 F.R.D. 45 (1958); Freund, The Pleadingand
Pre-Trialof an Antitrust Claim, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 555 (1961); Note, Improved Definition of
Discovery Relevance: A Path Out of the Antitrust ProceduralQuagmire, 30 U. FLA. L. RE'.'.
751 (1978).
81. See, e.g., Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., Inc., 586 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1978);
Ackerman-Chillingworth v. Pacific Electrical Contractors Ass'n, 579 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1978);
Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal Inc., 546 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1976); Ark Dental Supply Co. v.
Cavitron, 461 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1972); Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 462 F. Supp. 685 (M.D.
Fla. 1978); Natrona Serv. Inc. v. Continental Oil, 435 F. Supp. 99 (D. Wyo. 1977) (summary
judgment granted "[W]here the court has permitted extensive discovery, and where the
requirements of Rule 56 . . .are satisfied"); Kendall Elevator Co. v. L.B.C. & W. Assoc. of
South Carolina, 350 F. Supp. 75 (D.S.C. 1972); Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco
Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
82. See Akron Pressform Mold Co. v. McNeil Corp., 496 F.2d 230, 235 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 997 (1974); Saenz v. University Interscholastic League, 487 F.2d 1026, 1028
(5th Cir. 1973); Beal v. Lindsay, 468 F.2d 287, 291 (2d Cir. 1972); American Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. Delta Communications Corp., 408 F. Supp. 1075, 1086 (S.D. Miss. 1976); Gasperi v.
Cinemette Corp., 391 F. Supp. 826, 832-33 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
83. 582 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1978).
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sence of facts" from which a conspiracy could be inferred." The
Seventh Circuit, in affirming per curiam, ruled that, "it was up to
plaintiff to produce significant probative evidence by affidavit or
deposition that conspiracy existed if summary judgment was to be
avoided." 85 The court rejected plaintiff's contention that defendant's alleged bad faith in continuing to license the film with another theater for less favorable terms leads to an inference that the
licensing was the product of a conspiracy." Specifically, the court
ruled that even if the terms were less favorable, a departure from a
competitive bidding scheme was insufficient to prove a conspiracy.87
The Seventh Circuit also found the plaintiff, in the two and onehalf years since the filing of the suit, had failed to produce any evidefendant's sworn denial of the existence
dence to counterbalance
8
of a conspiracy.
Finally, the Lamb's Patio Theatre court determined that a departure from competitive bidding, standing alone, did not raise an
inference of conspiracy. The defendant, under the Colgate doctrine, 9 was free to reject plaintiff's bid for any reason as long as the
decision was a unilateral one. Accordingly, the court concluded
that, under these circumstances, a plaintiff must supply further
evidence to raise an inference of conspiracy. Thus, until such an
inference is raised, the movant is relieved of his burden to rebut the
plaintiff's allegations as required by Pollerand Norfolk Monument.
A more difficult situation occurs when plaintiff's allegations,
standing alone, do raise an inference of concerted action. Then,
typically, the lower courts have required the moving party to rebut
the inferences by its own affirmative evidence. 0 If this is success84. 1977-1 Trade Cases 61,517 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
85. 582 F.2d at 1070.
86. Id., citing Brown v. Western Mass. Theatres, Inc., 288 F.2d 302, 304 (1st Cir. 1961).
87. Id.
88. The situation where the non-movant utilizes discovery extensively and fails to obtain
inferential proof of a conspiracy is analogous to an opposing party's failure to employ available discovery in prosecution of his claim. See Note, Factors Affecting the Grant or Denial
of Summary Judgment, 48 COLUM. L. Rav. 780, 782 (1948). In neither case is a genuine issue
of fact left for resolution. See note 99, infra.
89. In United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919), the Supreme Court ruled that
one party may unilaterally refuse to deal with another for any reason without violating the
antitrust laws. See also.Bell v. Speed Queen, 407 F.2d 1022, 1027 (7th Cir. 1969); Dart Drug
Corp. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 221 F. Supp. 948 (D.D.C. 1963), aff'd, 344 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir.
1965). The doctrine permitting unilateral refusals to deal has been carefully limited by the
Supreme Court. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); United States
v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Beech-Nut
Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922); Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208
(1921).
90. See Mutual Fund Investors v. Putnam Management Co., 553 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1977);
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fully accomplished, the party in opposition must come forth with
additional evidence of conspiracy in order to raise a genuine issue
of material fact necessary to defeat a motion for summary judgment.
Thus, in Solomon v. Houston Corrugated Box Co.," the Fifth
Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment when the plaintiff
failed to adequately support his allegations of a conspiracy after
the defendant successfully rebutted the inferences raised by the
pleadings. The plaintiff was engaged in the corrugated carton business and brought suit against his major used-carton supplier and
his major competitor, alleging a conspiracy to eliminate all of plaintiff's sources of supply for used cartons. Implicit in the alleged
conspiracy was the existence of an exclusive selling arrangement
between the co-defendants. The court, however, found that the
defendants had rebutted the charges of conspiratorial exclusivity
"by substantial, sworn, reasonable, and believable evidence concerning business dealings and judgment."9 Since plaintiff failed
to present evidence to support its bare assertions of concerted action, the court found summary judgment appropriate.
A similar approach was adopted by the EighthCircuit in Willmar
Poultry Co. v. Morton-Norwich Products, Inc.93 There, the plaintiff filed suit alleging that defendants had engaged in a conspiracy
to prevent the importation of the drug furazolidone into the United
States for the purpose. of maintaining the price of the drug at anticompetitive levels in the domestic market. 4 On a motion for summary judgment, one defendant established that it did not distribute
furazolidone during the period in question 59 When the plaintiffs
failed to introduce any additional evidence of defendant's participation in the alleged conspiracy, the trial court granted defendant's
motion. 6 The Eighth Circuit affirmed, stating that the defendant
was not in a position to violate the antitrust laws if it no longer sold
furazolidone.17
ALW, Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 510 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1975); Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal,
Inc., 546 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1976).
91. 526 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1976).
92. Id. at 395.
93. 520 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1975).
94. Id. at 292.
95. Id. at 296.
96. Id. Plaintiffs had filed affidavits under Rule 56(f) to demonstrate that the entry of
summary judgment prior to discovery would be premature. But the court held that plaintiffs
had failed to establish any cause for postponement of consideration of the motion for summary judgment. "Rule 56(f) is not a shield that can be raised to block a motion for summary
judgment without even the slightest showing by the opposing party that his opposition is
meritorious." Id. at 297.
97. Id.
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It is apparent that under this approach the burden of proof shifts
to the non-moving party once the movant has rebutted the inferences of conspiratorial conduct with evidence supporting an alternative interpretation of its conduct. At that point, the opposing
party can no longer be complacent to stand upon uncorroborated
allegations of concerted activity.
The shifting of the burden of proof once the non-movant's inferences are rebutted is consistent with the earlier analysis of the Cities
Service decision."' It may be that the lower courts in permitting
summary judgment are not consciously considering the facts in the
light most favorable to the non-movant. And instead of following
the Poller, Norfolk Monument, Adickes requirement that all inferences of conspiracy be conclusively disproved for summary judgment to issue, the lower courts may be showing a reluctance to
permit the non-movant to merely rest on his allegations when the
movant presents some, albeit not necessarily conclusive, evidence
rebutting the existence of a conspiracy." Such an approach is in
keeping with Rule 56(e). 101
98. See text accompanying notes 61-62, supra.
99. Further clouding the picture are the non-movant's typical arguments that he has not
yet had sufficient discovery to establish his case. Rule 56(f) permits a court to allow additional
discovery before ruling on a pending motion for summary judgment. The Willmar court
viewed the problem as follows:
Where there has been no opportunity for discovery or it is yet to be undertaken or
is incomplete, the courts have applied this [Poller] policy to prohibit altogether
summary judgment on the merits in antitrust litigation. . . .On the other hand,
where there has been ample opportunity for discovery, summary judgment is appropriate in antitrust litigation, just as in any other litigation, upon a showing by the
movant of an absence of any genuine issue of material fact.
520 F.2d at 293. The Willmar Court believed that only when the ground for summary judgment is a defense going to the merits (e.g., statute of limitations) or where the non-movant
relies solely on his pleadings and submits no affirmative evidence to show that an issue of
material fact does exist should summary judgment be granted before the non-movant has had
discovery. See Frey v. Pine Hill Concrete Mix Corp., 554 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1977) (refusal to
grant summary judgment before discovery completed); National Fire Ins. v. Soloman, 529
F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1975).
Where the non-movant has made use of discovery but failed to establish the existence of a
material issue of fact in opposition to the proof submitted in support of a motion for summary
judgment, the courts will grant the motion. See Modern Home v. Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co., 513 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1975) (no issue of material fact after eight years and
five thousand pages of discovery by plaintiff); Clark v. United Bank of Denver, 480 F.2d
235 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1004 (1973); Natrona Serv., Inc. v. Continental Oil
Co., 435 F. Supp. 99 (D.C. Wyo. 1977). Thus, it can be surmised that discovery alleviates, at
least to some extent, the fear of trial by affidavit alluded to by the Poller Court.
In Aviation Specialties, Inc. v. United Technologies Corp., 568 F.2d 1186 (5th Cir. 1978),
the court permitted summary judgment where the non-movant delayed in discovery but
claimed insufficient discovery to avoid summary judgment, ruling that "[P]laintiff must
bear the consequences of its decision to proceed with discovery piecemeal." Id. at 1190.
100. See text accompanying notes 71-72, supra.
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Thus, as a practical matter, many courts follow the Cities Service
approach and balance the most probable inferences in determining
whether the movant has successfully discharged his burden and has
rebutted the inferences of illicit agreement. Under this approach,
a court must at some point consider whether the movant's rebuttal
evidence is strong enough to eliminate the existence of a genuine
issue of fact. In cases in which the non-movant raises an inference
only by bare allegations, with no supporting evidence, plausible
rebuttal proof of the movant's conduct makes the court's task quite
complex. In that circumstance it is unlikely that balancing the inferences adduced from the proof put forth by the adversaries will
result in a conclusion that no genuine issue of fact remains for trial.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Underlying a court's analysis of the varying inferences, and indeed, underlying Rule 56(c)'s requirement that no genuine issue of
fact remain for trial, is the finality of summary judgment to a plaintiff's lawsuit. The failure of a proponent of a summary judgment
motion to prevail has the result of forcing him to regroup for a trial
on the merits. Yet, failure of the opposing party to defeat such a
motion deprives him of his constitutional right to a trial by jury and
effectively sends him packing.' 0' Further, the circumstantial or indirect evidence, which is at the heart of inferential conspiracy cases,
may inherently leave genuine issues of fact to be resolved at trial,
assuming both sides present at least a modicum of evidence about
defendant's behavior. Typically, inferential proof presents interpretation problems which are the particular province of the jury. For
these reasons, the imposition of the initial burden of persuasion on
the movant appears reasonable.' 2
Further, the burden placed upon the movant in a summary judgment proceeding does not differ greatly from the burden of a defendant to an alleged inferential conspiracy at the trial level. Theatre
Enterprises established that a plaintiff must do more than provide
mere proof of conscious parallel business behavior to raise an inference of conspiracy.' 3 However, both Theatre Enterprises and
101. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504
(1958); Fleitmann v. Welsbach Street Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27, 29 (1915); Cherokee Laboratories, Inc. v. Rotary Drilling Services, Inc., 383 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1967); Ring v. Spina, 166
F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1948); Lah v. Shell Oil Co., 50 F.R.D. 198 (S.D. Ohio 1970); Hartford Empire
v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 3 F.R.D. 50 (W.D. Pa. 1943).
102. See note 79, supra.
103. As a practical matter, plaintiff at trial must present evidence in addition to parallel
conduct that a conspiracy existed to get past the directed verdict stage and reach a jury. See
L. SuLLvAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 317 (1977). However, it is not clear
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Interstate Circuit indicate that once inferences strong enough to
warrant a finding of conspiracy are raised the defendant must come
forth with evidence rebutting the inferences; that is, evidence establishing non-conspiratorial motives for the defendant's actions.""
The jury then must weigh the plausibility of the inferences raised
by the conflicting evidence much as a judge does at the summary
judgment level.105
Thus, at trial the plaintiff must do more than rest upon bare
allegations to reach a jury, but while he is defending a motion for
summary judgment, the necessary inferences can apparently be
drawn from the allegations themselves. There, defendant has the
initial burden to rebut the inferences; subsequently the plaintiff
must present probative evidence of the conspiracy only if defendant
is successful in producing evidence showing alternative reasons for
his behavior. 06 Thus, while defendant must at some point bear the
burden of rebuttal in both situations, the plaintiff has a more difficult initial burden at trial. It is submitted that the differences analyzed here accurately reflect the varying degrees of importance
whether mere proof that the parallel conduct was conscious, that is, proof that each alleged
conspirator knew of the similar actions of others, is enough to get plaintiff to the jury.
One court has used this analysis in holding that plaintiffs in opposition to motions for
summary judgment in a Sherman Act case could not rely on conscious parallelism alone to
create an inference of conspiratorial conduct by defendant in order to defeat their motions.
Romae Resources, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 378 F. Supp. 543, 552 (D. Conn.
1974), affirmed sub noma., Modern Home Inst., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 513
F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1975).
Areeda and Turner describe conscious parallel behavior, as well as other 'rules' of antitrust
law (such as the per se illegality of price-fixing and boycotts) as creating substantive presumptions. As such, the 'rules' create presumptions a defendant moving for summary judgment must overcome to receive a summary judgment. Thus, the Norfolk Monument decision
can be seen more as "[a] view about the probative significance of parallel action" than as a
statement on summary judgment. The Norfolk Monument Court, under such an analysis,
would give much weight to the parallel behavior found in that case. AREEDA & TURNER, note
3, supra.
104. For example, in InterstateCircuit defendants' failure to present witnesses in a position to deny the conspiracy may have been fatal to their defense. The Court stated that
"[wihen the proof supported, as we think it did, the inference of such concert, the burden
rested on [defendants] of going forward with the evidence to explain away or contradict it."
306 U.S. at 225-26. In Theatre Enterprisesthe defendants successfully rebutted the inferences
raised of concerted activity by producing evidence of local economic conditions which supported their position that their refusal to license first-run films to plaintiff's theater was the
result of "individual business judgment motivated by the desire for maximum revenue." 346
U.S. at 542.
105. Of course, evidence which conclusively establishes either the existence or nonexistence of a conspiracy takes the case from the jury. The trial judge must then direct a
verdict for the party with the conclusive evidence since no questions of fact remain for the
jury to determine.
106. This burden is typically imposed despite the requirements of Rule 56(e). See note
70 and accompanying text, supra.
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and finality to each litigant of summary judgment proceedings and
trial on the merits.
In analyzing the role of the litigants in summary judgment adjudication, the value of summary procedures in complex antitrust
litigation should not be forgotten. It has been asserted that summary judgment can help define the issues, reduce the scope of discovery, shorten the length of trial and increase the prospect of settlement. 107 Certainly the judiciary should be urged to realistically and
effectively use summary judgments to scale down and simplify the
complex, interminable antitrust litigation that plagues the federal
courts.
Thus, the strong justifications for imposing the initial burden of
persuasion upon the moving party do not counsel in favor of the
Poller, Norfolk Monument, Adickes view. The burden on a movant
to rebut all possible inferences raised by the plaintiff's allegations
not only undercuts Rule 56(e), but substantially impairs the utility of summary judgment procedure to rid the courts of frivolous
claims and expedite the adjudication of lengthy, involved antitrust
suits.
107.

See

REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND

PROCEDURES, reprinted in, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.

(BNA) No. 897 at 21.

